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ASSESSMENT
European climate policy is gradually shifting towards a long-term perspec-
tive. The electricity sector has a crucial role to play in the long-term decar-
bonization of the EU economy. It makes up a significant share of EU emis-
sions and can contribute to the reduction of emissions in other sectors, 
particularly buildings and transport. The EU 2008 Climate and Energy 
Package (CEP) took a significant step towards a low-carbon future, initi-
ating a very ambitious program of renewables expansion and strengthen-
ing the ETS. However, the omissions and internal inconsistencies of the 
CEP are becoming more and more evident. This relates in particular to the 
absence of long-term, comprehensive signals for decarbonization and the 
imbalance between the ETS, energy efficiency and renewables objectives. 
This risks delaying and distorting investment in low-carbon infrastructure 
and ideas, raising the ultimate cost of climate policy.  
RECOMMENDATIONS   
In view of the inertias within the electricity sector, it is imperative for the 
EU to set a long-term signal for the decarbonization of the sector by set-
ting 2030 objectives for the ETS and complementary policies. The EU’s 
decarbonization strategy needs to be robust against future uncertainties; 
strengthening a technology neutral instrument like the ETS can provide a 
key part of a comprehensive signal to develop the full range of decarbon-
ization options. The instrument imbalance also needs to be addressed. 
Demand side policies should be the point of departure for supply side 
interventions: ETS caps should be set so as to achieve carbon scarcity 
after energy efficiency and RES objectives have been taken into account. 
A short-term adjustment of scarcity in the ETS may create some incen-
tives for low-carbon investment. However, it would not address the funda-
mental concern, namely the lack of policy information regarding the post 
2020 environment in which these investment will amortize. 
Decarbonizing  
the EU Power Sector
Policy Approaches in the Light 
of Current Trends and Long-term 
Trajectories
WORkINg PAPER
n°13/11 nOVEMBER 2011 | CLiMATE
Thomas Spencer, Céline Marcy,  
Michel Colombier, Emmanuel Guérin (IDDRI)
ww
w.
id
dr
i.o
rg
Disclaimer
This paper is part of the Project “Is there a case for 
the EU moving beyond 20% GHG emissions reduc-
tion target by 2020?” convened by Climate Strate-
gies. Reports and presentations pertaining to this 
project are available at http://www.climatestrate-
gies.org/research/our-reports/category/57.html
The views expressed in this paper are those of the 
author(s) and do not necessarily represent those 
of Climate Strategies, or its policies. All reasonable 
measures have been taken to ensure the quality, 
reliability, and accuracy of the information in this 
publication.
About Climate Strategies
Climate Strategies is an international organisa-
tion that convenes networks of leading academic 
experts around specific climate change policy chal-
lenges. From this it offers rigorous, independent 
research to governments and the full range of 
stakeholders, in Europe and beyond. 
Climate Strategies c/o University of Cambridge
http://www.climatestrategies.org»www.climat-
estrategies.org 
Publisher
Publisher i.e. Climate Strategies 2011
For citation: Spencer, T., Colombier, M. and 
C. Marcy, “Decarbonizing the EU Power Sector - 
Policy Approaches in the Light of Current Trends 
and Long-term Trajectories”, Paris: IDDRI and 
Climate Strategies, 2011.
◖◖◖
Authors
For more information about this document, please 
contact the authors:
Thomas Spencer thomas.spencer@iddri.org
Céline Marcy celine.marcy@iddri.org
Michel Colombier michel.colombier@iddri.org
Emmanuel Guérin emmanuel.guerin@iddri.org
idéEs POuR LE déBAT 05/2011 3iddRi
Decarbonizing the EU 
Power Sector
Policy Approaches in the Light 
of Current Trends and Long-term 
Trajectories
LisT Of figuREs 4
LisT Of TABLEs 4
inTROduCTiOn And COnTEXT 5
1.CuRREnT inVEsTMEnT TREnds And gEnERAL sECTORAL 
COnTEXT 5
1.1. Investment trends 6
1.2. Current drivers of investment and future trends 7
2. sTudiEs Of Eu POwER sECTOR dECARBOnizATiOn  8
3. ThE dEMAnd sidE Of ThE EquATiOn 8
4. ThE suPPLy sidE Of ThE EquATiOn  9
4.1. Inertias and technology and portfolio options  9
4.2. Decarbonization scenario mixes for Europe 12
5. ThE POLiCy COnTEXT 14
5.1. Investment needs and implications for policy 14
5.2. Investment under uncertainty in the electricity 
sector 15
5.3. What role for the ETS in a policy mix?  16
5.4. The signal sent by the EU ETS 16
6. COnCLusiOns: POLiCy RECOMMEndATiOns 21
REfEREnCEs 23
Thomas Spencer,  
Céline Marcy, Michel Colombier, 
Emmanuel Guérin (IDDRI)
LisT Of figuREs
Figure 1: newly installed capacities 
in Europe in 2010    page 6
Figure 2 : projected installed 
capacities in Europe page 7 
Figure 3: decommissionings 
and planned constructions 2010-2020  page 12
Figure 4: EUA futures prices 2011-2015, 
left panel; financial intermediaries’ 
projections for EUA prices Phase III, 
right panel  page 17
Figure 5: sources of marginal 
cost uncertainty in the ETS, 
2020 and 2030  page 18
Figure 6: projections 
of gross electricity generation, 
2010-2030  page 19
LisT Of TABLEs
Table 1 : additions, retirements, 
and investment needs in the OECD 
power sector to 2035 page 7
Table 2: investment costs 
in the power sector page 14
Decarbonizing the EU Power Sector: Policy Approaches in the Light of Current Trends and Long-term Trajectories
working PAPEr 13/2011 5IddrI
inTROduCTiOn And COnTEXT
In October 2009, the EU agreed to a reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) of 80-95% 
by 2050, against 1990 levels (European Council, 
2009). Among EU Member States and internation-
ally, the paradigm is gradually shifting away from 
marginal emissions reductions towards long-term, 
low-carbon development (THINK, 2011; Neuhoff, 
2011). The EU’s long-term objective therefore 
casts European climate and energy policy into a 
fundamentally new light. It is no longer sufficient 
to attain the EU’s 2020 objectives; rather, policies 
for the short-term (2020) must place the EU on an 
economically feasible trajectory towards its 2050 
objective. 
A number of recent studies have analyzed the 
achievement of ambitious decarbonization objec-
tives by 2050 within the EU (ECF, 2010; IEA, 2010; 
Eurelectric, 2011; EC, 2011). They all agree that 
such an objective is technically attainable under a 
variety of technology/policy scenarios. They also 
agree that a particularly significant role must be 
played by the electricity sector, due to its dominant 
share of EU emissions;1 and the lower marginal 
abatement costs in this sector, which could allow it 
to adopt much of the effort of decarbonizing other 
sectors, notably transport and heating/cooling.
The electricity system requires synchronous 
balancing of supply and demand. Demand is rela-
tively inelastic, especially in the short term, and 
therefore supply must follow demand.2 Rigorous 
demand side policies will be required to allow the 
electricity sector to adopt much of the decarboni-
zation effort in other sectors at manageable invest-
ment costs. However, both the scale and timing of 
electrification are uncertain, as are the adoption 
1. ~32% of EU27 CO2 emissions 
2. This could change in the long-term depending on the 
introduction of advanced demand side management. 
and ultimate effectiveness of demand reduction 
policies. Demand side policies interact in turn 
with supply related policies, such as the ETS and 
RES policies by impacting the scarcity and hence 
the price of carbon in an ETS. This interaction can 
place both upside and downside pressure on the 
carbon price, depending on the actual success of 
demand side policies and the ex ante calibration of 
the ETS and energy efficiency policies.    
Demand scenarios therefore form the es-
sential point of departure for policies related 
to the supply of low-carbon electricity. This 
paper therefore takes as a starting point the role 
of demand-side efforts in the decarbonization of 
the electricity sector. Its objective is to assess the 
coherence of the current policy framework in the 
electricity sector with the decarbonization agenda 
of the EU. It is structured as follows. Section 1 be-
gins with the status quo: it examines recent invest-
ment trends in the EU electricity sector, and the key 
drivers for investment. Section 2 briefly describes 
key features common to the published studies on 
decarbonizing the EU power sector. Section 3 then 
examines in more detail the demand side of the 
decarbonization equation, in particular the role of 
demand reduction in the transition. On the basis 
thereof, section 4 examines the supply side of the 
equation, drawing out the policy implications of 
high inertias and uncertainties in the sector. Sec-
tion 5 then zooms in on the policy context, focus-
ing in particular on the transformational signals 
sent by the policy mix. Section 6 concludes with 
policy recommendations.
1.CuRREnT inVEsTMEnT TREnds 
And gEnERAL sECTORAL COnTEXT
This section briefly gives the context for the 
following discussion of decarbonization in the 
electricity sector. It displays recent investment 
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trends, and breaks down the scale and drivers of 
future BAU investment needs by decade (2010-
2020 vs. 2020-2030) and region (Western vs. 
Eastern Europe).   
1.1. Investment trends
Over the last two decades, investment in the EU 
power mix has been marked by two dominant 
trends. The first was a continual increase in total 
electricity demand, of roughly 75% between 1990 
and 2008 (Eurelectric, 2010, pp. 10). The second 
has been a dramatic expansion in gas and RES 
in the electricity supply. Gas has seen the most 
dramatic growth, by roughly 420% between 1990 
and 2008, from 167.5 TWh to 868.8 TWh in 2008 
(IEA, 2011, pp.  IV. 59).3 This was driven by a feed-
back loop of technological breakthroughs allowing 
the construction of cheap, relatively small-scale 
gas units, while market liberalization introduced 
competition, creating economic conditions in 
which gas proved very attractive (cf. Winskel, 
2002). Technology improvements and public 
support schemes have also driven an increase in 
renewables of 41% between 1990 and 2008 (IEA, 
2011, pp.  IV. 59). In particular biomass-and-waste 
and wind generation have grown dramatically, 
albeit from a low base. Nuclear, hydro and coal 
generation have remained roughly stable. In the 
decade 2000-2010, gas (49%), wind (28%) and 
solar (10%) made up the dominant capacity invest-
ments in Europe
Roughly 55 GW of new capacity were installed 
in Europe in 2010.  These can be decomposed as 
follows:  
3. NB. Figures for OECD Europe. 
A dash for gas: the majority of planned and un-
der construction plants are combined cycle natu-
ral gas turbines (CCGT). In 2009, gas-fired capac-
ity represented 19% of installed capacity. In 2010, 
the newly added capacities reached 28 280 MW. 
The wave of CCGT construction is particularly pro-
nounced in Spain, Germany, the UK and France. 
Nevertheless, over 30GW of gas-fired projects have 
been put on hold, largely as a result of the impact 
of the crisis on projected electricity demand and 
the availability of financing. A number of factors 
have driven this dash for gas, including: 
 m a more attractive risk profile for private financ-
ing, due among other factors to lower capital 
costs and the ability of (marginal) gas plant to 
pass on fuel/carbon price fluctuations into elec-
tricity prices (cf. Hood, 2011). Thus electricity 
prices and gas prices tend to co-vary providing 
a hedge for gas-fired producers; 
 m relatively low gas/coal price ratios in recent 
years; and 
 m environmental and social opposition to other 
forms of thermal generation.
A dash for RES: wind and solar represented 17% 
and 22% of newly installed capacity in 2010, at 12 
GW and 9.3 GW respectively (figure 1 above). New 
capacity investments in RES are driven largely by 
national support schemes, implemented for domes-
tic energy security or green industrial policy objec-
tives, or to meet the 20% RES objective in the 2008 
EU climate and energy package. The dramatic suc-
cess of such schemes in promoting capacity expan-
sion has led to social cost concerns, as well as for the 
secure integration of RES into the grid. In addition, 
demand reduction as a result of the recession means 
more competition between different technologies. 
Recent retroactive adjustments to support schemes 
(e.g. Spain) highlight these tensions. 
figure 1. Newly installed capacities in Europe in 2010
Biomass 573MW
Small hydro 25MW
Geothermal 25MW 
Nuclear 145 MW
Waste 149 MW 
Peat 200 MW 
Large hydro 208 MW 
CSP 405 MW
Gas 51%
28 280 MW  
PV 22%
12 000 MW
Wind 17 %
 9 295 MW 
Coal 7%
 4 056 MW
Others 3%
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A shift away from coal: looking back over the last 
3 years, around 23 GW of planned new coal capac-
ity have either been suspended or cancelled. Nev-
ertheless, the European Wind Energy Association 
states that in 2010 the EU power sector installed 
more coal than it decommissioned - 4 056 MW 
have been installed in 2010, while roughly 2 000 
MW have been decommissioned over the same pe-
riod (EWEA, 2011). Around 13 GW of coal power 
plants are under construction in Europe.
Hurdles in nuclear investments: the nuclear in-
dustry faces financing difficulties due to its high 
exposure to cost of capital risks (cf. Rothwell, 
2006); exposure to electricity price risks (cf. Yang 
et al, 2008), as well as policy/social risks. Most 
nuclear projects have been delayed, particularly 
in UK and in Eastern Europe (Lithuania, Poland). 
Nuclear once again faces strong public oposition 
following the Fukushima disaster. Given planned 
retirements (UK) and nuclear phase outs (nota-
bly Germany), a significant investment program 
would be required just to maintain the share of 
nuclear in the EU electricity mix in the coming de-
cades (cf. ENTSO-E, 2010). Concerns that the cur-
rent policy framework is insufficiently robust to 
promote merchant-based nuclear investment have 
also motivated the proposed electricity market re-
form in the UK, for example. 
1.2. C urrent drivers of 
investment and future trends
The EU power sector is approaching a major invest-
ment cycle driven by a number of factors. For 
further clarification, these can be usefully broken 
down into the two coming decades (2010-2020 and 
2020-2030) and Western and Eastern Europe. 
In the coming decade, the EU is expected to re-
tire roughly 18% of existing capacity, or 150 GW 
compared to installed capacity of roughly 850 GW 
in 2009 (cf IEA, 2010b; Eurelectric, 2011). BAU 
electricity demand growth of roughly 1.5% for the 
decade (cf. ENTSO-E, 2010; EC, 2010) would lead 
to another 150 GW being installed, with a total 
capacity by 2020 of around 1000 GW. Therefore, 
total BAU capacity investments for the EU27 con-
verge at a figure of around 300 GW of new invest-
ment by 2020. 
In the decade following (2020-2030), both re-
tirements and investments increase due inter alia 
to the aging fleet and the need for new, low-car-
bon capacities. Table 1 displays estimates of re-
tirements, additions and investment needs in the 
OECD Europe power sector to 2035. Retirements 
are likely to accelerate somewhat in the latter de-
cade, and investments will likely by dominated 
by high nameplate capacity, low capacity credit 
renewables.
Table 1. Additions, retirements, and investment needs in 
the OECD power sector to 20354 
  
4. N.B. figures for OECD Europe.  
2010-2020 2021-2035
Additions
(gw)
Retirements
(gw)
investment
(usd2009 
bln)
Additions
(gw)
Retirements
(gw)
investments
(usd2009 bln)
337 158 694 498 348 1 080
Source: IEA, 2010b
figure 2. Projected installed capacities in Europe*
* Includes the EU27, and the Republic of Ireland, Norway, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, the Republic of Serbia, and 
Switzerland.  
Source: ENTSO-E, 2010.
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The drives for investment are somewhat more 
pronounced in Eastern Europe. In the CEE region, 
economic growth is expected to be higher in the 
coming decade, and electricity consumption per 
capita is currently lower, as a legacy of socialism.5 
Projected demand growth is therefore higher in 
the region (roughly 2% compared to 1.5% for the 
EU27) in the coming decade. In addition, the tur-
bulent process of the post-socialist transition and 
the enormous “energy efficiency reserve” avail-
able in the region has led to a hiatus of investment 
over the past several decades. Therefore, rapidly 
aging capital stock will require significant invest-
ments in the region in the coming decade. 
Bottom up BAU projections from European TSOs 
provide an insight into the trajectory of the elec-
tricity mix over the coming decade under existing 
policy frameworks. It should be noted that these 
are from the perspective of the policy maker, not 
the private investor; section 6 will discuss the im-
plications of second-best policy effects on the deci-
sions of investors. Nonetheless, these projections 
can generate useful insights. They are dominated 
by two marked trends: firstly, the dramatic expan-
sion of installed RES capacity, which grows by 
162% between 2010 and 2020, from 101 GW in 2010 
to 262 GW in 2020; secondly, a similar jump in gas-
fired capacity of some 60%, from 155 GW in 2010 
to 246 GW in 2020. Other generation technologies 
roughly retain their absolute levels of installed ca-
pacity, although hydro, including pumped hydro, 
also experiences an increase, driven mainly by in-
vestments in Austria, Switzerland, Spain and Por-
tugal. The projected evolution in the generation 
mix is shown in figure 2 above.
2. sTudiEs Of Eu POwER 
sECTOR dECARBOnizATiOn 
This section briefly places the current trends 
discussed above in a longer-term perspective. 
From the published body of literature on the 
decarbonization of the EU economy and the elec-
tricity sector, several high level commonalities can 
be drawn (cf. RSCAS, 2011):   
 m The need for dramatic demand reduction rela-
tive to BAU levels, in order to reduce the invest-
ment challenge and partially offset the eventual 
electrification of buildings and transport. 
 m The need to roll out existing technologies, 
and develop and deploy new technologies and 
5. Socialist societies are sometimes called “frozen 
consumption” societies, due to the much lower levels 
of private consumption. During the process of catch-up 
to Western European levels of welfare, this legacy will 
erode.   
techno-institutional innovations (e.g. smart 
grids) in order to decarbonize the power sector 
at manageable cost. 
 m The need to expand and strengthen the internal 
EU energy market in order to enable the geo-
graphical hedging of intermittent renewable re-
sources and the sharing of dispatchable back-up 
capacities. 
This is not the place for a detailed review of 
these policy priorities for decarbonization. Rather, 
the following sections delve more deeply into the 
demand and supply sides of the decarbonization 
equation, in particular to identify potential incon-
sistencies between current trends and the trajecto-
ries implied by the literature on the decarboniza-
tion of the EU power sector. In particular, we focus 
below on the demand side of the equation as the 
essential point of departure for decarbonization 
policies in the sector.      
3. ThE dEMAnd sidE 
Of ThE EquATiOn
This section examines the role of the demand 
side in the decarbonization of the economy and 
the electricity sector. It underscores the role of 
the electricity sector in decarbonizing other final 
demand sectors (transport and buildings), and the 
need to undertake dramatic demand reduction 
policies in order to make this feasible.  
All studies of decarbonization in the power sec-
tor agree that very significant improvements in 
energy efficiency compared to BAU are required i) 
to partially offset the projected demand increase 
from the electrification of stationary and mobile 
final consumption sectors, and ii) to keep the 
new capacity investment challenge manageable 
(cf. RSCAS, 2011; THINK, 2011). According to the 
Commission’s decarbonization roadmap, by 2050 
some 20% of final demand for heating and cooling 
would be electrified relative to less than 10% today 
(EC, 2011, pp. 76); for transport, this would reach 
39% in the effective technology scenario, and still 
13% in the delayed electrification scenario (EC, 
2011, pp. 68). 
Thus, generally speaking, decarbonization tra-
jectories display significant reductions in elec-
tricity demand in the period 2010-2030, followed 
by an increased in demand 2030-2050 relative to 
BAU, as electrification of final demand begins in 
earnest (cf. Eurelectric, 2011; EC, 2011). This would 
place greater burdens on the power sector towards 
2050, but is cost efficient from an economy wide 
perspective due to the lower marginal abatement 
costs in the electricity sector. However, massive 
energy efficiency improvements are necessary 
decarbonizing the Eu Power sector: Policy Approaches in the Light of Current Trends and Long-term Trajectories
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in the final consumption sectors to keep their 
eventual electrification manageable from an 
investment perspective. For example, Eurelectric 
models that under a no energy efficiency policy 
scenario, total cumulative energy costs would be 
3552 billion Euro2005 higher than in the effective 
policy scenario, which includes additional mea-
sures in the final consumption sectors (Eurelectric, 
2011, pp. 77). Likewise, modeling by CIRED shows 
the added value of complementary demand avoid-
ance measures for example in the transport sector, 
in view of its eventual electrification (Guivarch 
and Rozenberg, 2011).  
By 2050, electricity savings in the order of ~1150 
TWh would need to be achieved in stationary final 
consumption sectors, relative to baseline levels, in 
order to partially offset the electrification of trans-
port and buildings (Eurelectric, 2011, pp. 52; ECF, 
2010, pp. 48). Deviations from BAU power con-
sumption need to start almost immediately, due to 
the i) long lead-time for energy savings policies to 
be implemented and take effect, and ii) the large 
share of energy savings that needs to be achieved 
in highly inert existing capital stock, especially 
buildings and transport infrastructures. For ex-
ample, Eurelectric models a reduction vs. baseline 
of 168 TWh and 468 TWh in the stationary sectors 
by 2020 and 2030 respectively, or ~5 and ~12% of 
projected net generation in the baseline (Eurelec-
tric, 2011). Eurelectric acknowledges that poten-
tials for greater savings also exist. 
Significant uncertainties exist regarding de-
mand evolution. Both the scale and timing of the 
electrification of further final consumption sectors 
is uncertain, as are the adoption and ultimate ef-
fectiveness of energy saving policies. Expectations 
of economic growth are likewise subject to very 
high uncertainties, especially when viewed over 
the short-term. However, electricity demand de-
fines scarcity and price of emissions allowances 
in the ETS, and the level of effort necessary to 
reach emissions reduction objectives and particu-
lar penetrations of clean generation technologies. 
This implies that a much clearer focus should be 
placed on the demand side when designing and 
implementing climate policies.    
From an economy wide perspective, electrifica-
tion of final demand in transport and buildings is 
cost efficient. However, from a sectoral perspec-
tive, this places an additional investment burden 
on the power sector, particularly in the period 
2030-2050. In order to keep this to a manageable 
level, in the period 2010-2030 it is necessary to un-
dertake significant policy efforts to improve the 
energy efficiency of these sectors. It is also neces-
sary to take into account interactions between sec-
tors (buildings, transport and power generation) 
and instruments (ETS and energy efficiency); 
these issues are the subject of section 6. Demand 
trajectories should therefore form the corner-
stone of decarbonization policy in the electric-
ity sector, and the point of departure for supply 
side policies. 
4. ThE suPPLy sidE Of ThE EquATiOn 
4.1. Inertias and technology 
and portfolio options 
4.1.1. Inertias in the power sector 
The power sector is characterized by very strong 
inertias. Long lead-in times for investment and 
very long infrastructure lifetimes mean that, 
firstly, any significant shift of investment will take 
time; and secondly, investment decisions will have 
a legacy effect of 20 to at least 40 years under 
“normal” conditions.6 Policy makers and firms are 
faced by significant uncertainties related in partic-
ular to the technical/social feasibility of future 
abatement options (i.e. CCS); the learning curve 
for current commercially immature technologies, 
and the delivery of enabling infrastructures such 
as electricity grids and CO2 transport and injection 
infrastructures.         
4.1.2. Technology characteristics 
Renewable energy technologies. The level of pene-
tration and of development of renewable energy 
technologies depends mainly on the level of tech-
nological and economic maturity, and the policy 
framework. While some technologies, notably 
onshore wind, are close to achieving competitive-
ness with conventional generation, other renew-
able energy technologies are less mature and still 
need R&D and deployment support. Among prom-
ising RES technologies, offshore wind is likely 
to see rapid learning, driven also by ambitious 
deployment programs. Some coastal European 
countries will rely on this technology for achieving 
their 2020 targets, e.g. Germany and the United-
Kingdom (with respectively roughly 7700 MW 
planned or approved projects in Germany to be 
on line by 2015 and 6700 MW planned, approved, 
applied or proposed projects in the United-
Kingdom).  As this technology is still immature 
in terms of costs, a high level of remuneration is 
required in support schemes.  
The support scheme and related policies im-
ply an important social cost that needs to be 
6. i.e. without the early decommissioning of capacities. 
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monitored and controlled. The economic cri-
sis and the dramatic success of some schemes in 
rolling out capacities has led to concern in some 
countries regarding costs and system security (e.g. 
Netherlands, Czech Republic). However, all re-
newable energy technologies are capital-intensive 
investments, with the major part of the costs being 
investment costs. Costs of capital for RES are high 
due to general liquidity constraints in European 
economies, and specific policy/technical risks. 
At larger-scale penetrations, the intermittency of 
some RES technologies begins to matter for system 
security. As the major expected increases in RES 
capacity will come from intermittent RES (off/on-
shore wind, PV), innovations in system coordina-
tion will be required to evolve concurrently (e.g. 
back-up capacity, interconnectors, storage, and 
advanced demand-side management). This will 
increase the system-wide investment costs. The 
coordination externalities attending the long-term 
transformation of the existing socio-technical 
complex are a major barrier to significant RES ex-
pansion (cf. Unruh, 2002).    
Nuclear. Currently, the lead-in time for building 
a nuclear generating capacity with a proven tech-
nology is at least 10 years in Europe. The Fukushi-
ma disaster will slow down potential investments 
in new nuclear capacity. Several dimensions need 
to be taken into account when considering the role 
of nuclear: 
 m Nuclear power is especially exposed to risk in 
terms of costs of capital. There are significant 
project management risks, due to the expense 
and complexity of implementing construction 
projects, especially with the new generation 3 
reactors. As a price taker in a liberalized market, 
it is also exposed to carbon, fuel and electricity 
price risks (for a breakdown of risk factors see 
e.g. Rothwell, 2006). 
 m The relative competitiveness of nuclear plant is 
closely linked to the gas and carbon price (NEA, 
2011). If gas and carbon prices remain low in 
coming years, as at present, this will decrease 
incentives to invest in merchant based nuclear. 
 m Therefore, investment in new nuclear plant 
would likely necessitate the involvement of the 
government to lower project risks and the cost 
of capital, either in the form of government loan 
guarantees or support instruments (e.g. the 
Electricity Market Reform in the UK). 
 m Harnessing nuclear power depends especially 
on the institutional environment surrounding 
the upstream (building the facility), the opera-
tion and the downstream (decommissioning 
and waste management) of the entire program, 
and particularly in countries that are not yet in-
volved in nuclear assets (e.g. Poland). 
 m The institutional environment must ensure the 
safety of the nuclear asset operation. Safety re-
gimes require specialized high-level engineer-
ing training as well as the reinforcement of the 
waste management procedures. Developing 
these capacities will take time in countries with 
no prior experience of managing nuclear plant. 
 m Lastly, nuclear faces public acceptance issues. 
Overcoming them would require that concerns 
be addressed as to the safety of the whole nu-
clear program in those countries considering 
new capacities. 
Assuming that risk issues can be solved and pub-
lic acceptance gained, developing a secure insti-
tutional environment and constructing new plant 
both require long lead-in times, limiting anyway 
the contribution of new nuclear in the coming two 
decades. 
Gas. Gas has been the preferred investment op-
tion for several years. Gas units are small, rapid to 
build and do not require high amount of capital, 
making them attractive to private investors. In the 
near future, new dynamics – positive and negative 
– are likely to come into play: 
 m As the penetration of intermittent renewables 
increases, more gas-fired capacity will poten-
tially be required for system balancing (with 
other options like storage and advanced de-
mand side management likely to take longer to 
come to scale). However, in systems with high 
RES penetrations, capacity factors for back-up 
plant will be low (this is currently deterring in-
vestment already in Germany). This would re-
quire a sufficient level of remuneration at peak 
times (through high spot prices or potentially 
capacity mechanisms) to attract investment.  
 m Environmental/climate policies can induce to 
coal-to-gas investment substitution. Policies on 
local air pollution and the ETS have changed 
the relative costs of gas and coal technologies 
somewhat, as have low gas prices over recent 
years. In addition, climate policy uncertainty 
may incentivize gas investment, as its profit-
ability is more secure against both upside and 
downside carbon price uncertainties due to its 
lower sunk costs; ability to set the price as the 
marginal plant, and lower emissions (see sec-
tion 6 below).  
Coal Investments in coal are much more com-
plex. In some CEE Member States (e.g. Poland), 
coal technology costs and the easy access to pri-
mary resources tend to encourage investment. 
However, if new coal-fired power plants are com-
missioned in coming years, they will lock-in capi-
tal stock for at least 40 years. If CCS fails to be de-
ployed at a significant scale (including retro-fits), 
the 2050 objectives will never be achieved without 
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draconian action (i.e. the premature shutdown of 
all coal-fired power plants by 2050). 
 m However, CCS faces a suite of challenges on 
the path to commercialization and large-scale 
deployment. These include technical hurdles 
(demonstration of large-scale, integrated plant); 
social acceptance hurdles with regard to onshore 
storage; coordination hurdles with regard to the 
construction of a large-scale CO2 transport infra-
structure, and financial hurdles with regard to 
public subsidies for demonstration and eventual 
acceptability by ratepayers of higher electric-
ity prices. Relative to unabated plant, the IEA 
estimates an increase in the levelized-costs of 
electricity from CCS plant of 55-64% for coal7 de-
pending on the capture route, and 33% for gas. 
Avoided CO2 costs range from 39-44 Euro2010/
ton for coal, to 60 Euro2010/ton for gas (Finken-
rath, 2011).8 According to analysis by the Com-
mission, carbon prices – assuming the achieve-
ment of RES and non-ETS objectives – will not 
be high enough to incentivize merchant-based 
CCS post 2020 (EC, 2010); this modeling also 
does not include the impact of the proposed en-
ergy efficiency directive, discussed below.  
4.1.3. Portfolio considerations 
The analysis of available electricity-generating 
technologies should also focus on the energy tech-
nology portfolio as the electricity system currently 
relies on a reasonably diversified portfolio of 
technologies (apart from in a small number of 
outlier countries, notably France and Poland). The 
perspective of the technology portfolio alters the 
picture for policy-makers and investors: 
 m Large-scale development of nuclear or coal 
CCS could inhibit the development of currently 
available renewable energy technology (i.e. 
wind power plants). For system management, 
the coexistence of large-scale, inflexible plants 
and intermittent renewable energy technologies 
makes balancing the electricity system difficult. 
 m The large-scale development of intermittent RES 
requires the implementation of back-up gas-
fuelled capacities,9 and advanced demand supply 
management and interconnectors. However, the 
large-scale deployment of RES will also reduce 
the load factor of conventional plant, decreasing 
its attractiveness without additional policy meas-
ures to ensure an adequate capacity margin.  
7. These figures are relative to conventional coal 
technology, not IGCC.  
8. 2010 UDD/Euro exchange rate of 1.3261 from the US 
Federal Reserve. 
9. Given the limitations on the expansion of hydro 
exploitation. 
 m Countries with a highly carbon intensive elec-
tricity sector (notably Poland with coal and Es-
tonia with shale oil) face strategic decisions on 
the mix, in order to reduce their exposure to in-
creasing carbon constraints. However, such sys-
tems exhibit significant path dependencies and 
inertias, as new technologies require changes in 
the existing social-technical complex and face 
market prices and conditions defined by the in-
cumbent technologies.    
 m Short-term (2020) carbon targets can be met with 
existing technologies. However, meeting longer-
term objectives cost effectively will require the 
deployment of new technologies throughout 
the electricity supply chain, from generation, to 
transmission (e.g. HVDC lines), to distribution 
and consumption (e.g. smart-grids) (cf. Linares 
and Pérez-Arriaga, 2009). Inertias in existing 
physical/regulatory systems and the need to 
guide private investment and R&D necessi-
tate the swift establishment of a longer-term 
vision and regulatory framework. The power 
sector should adapt to new technologies that 
will emerge in the future and leave room for 
their development and commercialization. 
4.1.4. Summary 
The electricity sector is characterized by high iner-
tias due to long lead times and plant lifetimes. 
Concerning the ramp up of low-carbon generation, 
individual technologies are also characterized by 
strong inertias, albeit to different degrees and for 
different reasons. For RES, inertia is due to the 
remaining cost gaps to commercialization,10 and 
especially to the system transformations required 
to integrate large-scale intermittent RES. For 
nuclear, inertia is due to the very long lead-time 
for nuclear projects, and financial, technical and 
social constraints to rapid expansion. CCS is a pre-
demonstration technology, and large-scale deploy-
ment is not foreseen before 2025-2030. Equally, 
the phase-out of high carbon assets is constrained 
by the feasibility/costs of alternative technolo-
gies, and the long commercial lifetimes of existing 
plants or new investments in unabated plants. As 
we saw in section 2.1.2 above, accelerating invest-
ments will be needed after 2020, which will be 
planned in this decade. This implies the need to 
swiftly set a long-term regulatory framework to 
shape investment decisions for the next genera-
tion of plant post 2020.
10. This differs by technology, and is due both to the 
immaturity of the technologies themselves, and the 
imperative to internalize the externality of GHGs from 
conventional generation. 
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4.2. Decarbonization 
scenario mixes for Europe
4.2.1. Decarbonization mixes – a little bit of 
everything? 
A number of studies have modeled the evolution of 
the generation mix under strong decarbonization. 
They tend to converge around a generation mix 
balanced between RES; coal and gas with CCS, 
and nuclear. However, several studies have also 
explored sensitivity scenarios involving higher 
shares of specific technology groups (e.g. the ECF, 
2010, 80% and 100% RES scenarios) or delay of a 
given technology (CCS delay scenarios in Eurelec-
tric, 2011, and EC, 2011). These sensitivity analyses 
indicate that decarbonization objectives could still 
be met, albeit at higher cost, e.g. an additional 
164 billion Euro2005 in the Eurelectric delayed 
CCS scenario or an additional investment cost of 
225 billion Euro in the ECF 100% RES scenario, 
compared to the 80% RES scenario. 
However, the general analytical convergence 
towards a vision of a balanced decarbonization 
mix is actually indicative of the uncertainty at-
tending each option. These risks relate to tech-
nology development, system integration, envi-
ronmental issues, social acceptance and cost, and 
were detailed briefly in section 5.1 above. Clearly, 
no decarbonization pathway is risk-free, and pol-
icy-makers will need to assess and balance deliv-
ery risks against multiple criteria and dimensions. 
More research at the interface of social science 
and technology policy is clearly needed. However, 
at this stage several implications can be drawn: 
 m Clearly, each technology option should be pur-
sued with a balanced combination of push and 
pull development strategies as appropriate, tak-
ing into account its individual characteristics 
(see below). 
 m However, the overall decarbonization strategy 
should be robust against the widest possible 
range of eventualities with regard to future 
technology deployment and carbon/fuel price 
evolutions. Technologies with “optionality”, i.e. 
the ability to operate in multiple future worlds, 
should be preferred. This places an even 
greater premium on energy efficiency so as 
to avoid new capacity investments under cur-
rent uncertainties. 
 m A longer-term policy framework would be 
desirable so that investments can take place 
in the presence of the fullest possible infor-
mation regarding the longer-term evolu-
tion of the sector. It would allow companies 
to better manage technology risks, and poten-
tially reduce those risks by stimulating private 
investment in R&D (for the impact of the ETS 
on private R&D in the electricity sector, see e.g. 
Rogge et al, 2011). The policy framework should 
include not just longer-term pricing signals, but 
also facilitate the enabling conditions for new 
technologies to enter the market, e.g. regulato-
ry provisions for new entrants; grid investment 
for RES, or CO2 transport for CCS.  
4.2.2. Are there risks in current trends? 
As noted in section 2 above, the current decar-
bonization trend in the power sector is maintained 
figure 3. Decommissionings and planned constructions 2010-2020
Source: Eurelectric, 2011. 
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by, firstly, the significant expansion of currently 
mature RES capacities, with also a growing share 
of emerging RES such as offshore wind; and 
secondly, the rapid expansion of gas-fired genera-
tion. This section discusses the risks that may 
attend the current approach. 
Carbon lock-in. According to the bottom-up pro-
jections of EU TSOs, by 2025 current investment 
trends would leave a legacy of roughly 430 GW of 
unabated fossil fuel capacity, at about 250 GW of 
gas capacity, and 180 GW of coal (ENTSO-E, 2010). 
According to Eurelectric’s bottom-up analysis of 
investment plans for the coming decade, the domi-
nant new capacities will be onshore wind (79.5 
GW), CCGT (73.2 GW), offshore wind (35 GW) 
and new coal (32 GW). These figures, and planned 
decommissionings for the decade, are shown in 
Figure 3 above. 
The projected investment in new fossil-fuel ca-
pacities, particularly in CCGT technology but also 
new coal, needs to be weighed carefully against a 
number of considerations: 
 m Of currently mature baseload technologies, gas 
represents a lower regret investment, due to its 
low capital intensity, low CO2 emissions and 
flexibility to back-up large shares of intermittent 
generation. The option value to deploy gas gen-
eration as back up for RES, or baseload with CCS, 
can be purchased at lower sunk cost compared to 
other baseload technologies, notably coal. Secu-
rity of supply concerns may also diminish over 
time, as European gas import capacities diversify 
(LNG and expanded intra-EU infrastructure) and 
shale-gas potentially comes online. However, 
even with unconventional gas, it appears unlike-
ly that European production will increase above 
current levels (cf. Gény, 2010)
 m However, fossil fuel investments will lock-in sig-
nificant capital infrastructure in gas and coal 
generation, and in gas import and distribution.11 
The reliance on a pre-demonstration abatement 
technology (CCS) brings back-end delivery 
risks, although these will be somewhat reduced 
for gas compared to coal. Risks of carbon lock-
in and stranded assets cannot be excluded, par-
ticularly with regard to new coal investments, 
as it is still uncertain what role CCS will play 
in the decarbonized mix in the EU. However, 
lengthening the carbon scarcity signal under 
the ETS would allow firms to better manage 
such technology risks surrounding CCS, and 
11. For example, the EC’s low-carbon roadmap projects gas 
import requirements under the to be some 36-42% below 
baseline levels by 2050, at roughly 250 bcm of imports by 
2050 (EC, 2011). This compares to projected BAU pipeline 
imports capacities of some 400 bcm by 2020 (ENTSO-G). 
potentially reduce those risks as firms in-
crease investment in R&D. In the current con-
text of short-term regulation, firms are likely to 
make suboptimal capital investments (e.g. po-
tential over-commitment to unabated fossil fu-
els) and lower levels of private R&D (cf. Bosetti 
and Victor, 2011). This may eventually transfer 
risks to the public sector, in the form of public 
commitment to R&D or even compensation for 
early retirement of high-carbon capacity (Guiv-
arch and Hood, 2011).12 At the least, invest-
ment decisions in fossil fuel capacity should 
be made in the presence of credible informa-
tion regarding the longer-term regulatory 
environment.
Focus on currently mature RES. The massive ex-
pansion in RES is often justified by the need to 
ensure learning-by-doing to accelerate cost reduc-
tions in RES technologies – there is evidence that 
this has indeed been successful. However, cost re-
ductions are, broadly speaking, the result of two 
processes: firstly, the expansion of capacity and 
usage (learning-by-doing), and secondly, invest-
ment in R&D (learning-by-researching). The ratio 
of learning-by-doing to learning-by-researching 
depends on a number of factors, including the 
level of maturity of the technology and the impor-
tance of economies of scale in the manufacturing 
process (Wiesenthal, 2010). It can be argued that 
the EU’s current technology development strategy 
for RES is weighted towards learning-by-doing. 
R&D investments in the Strategic Energy Technol-
ogy Plan (SET Plan) technologies13 amounted to 
just €2.38 billion Euro in 2007 (Wiesenthal, 2009). 
As a comparison, net support costs for renewable 
electricity amounted to €7 billion in the same year 
(Ecofys, 2011).  
However, some 70% of R&D financing into SET 
plan technologies comes from private corpora-
tions (Wiesenthal, 2009). This underscores the 
importance of a clear policy framework, includ-
ing market pull policies, to direct private R&D 
into low-carbon technologies. In this regard, 
the EU’s RES objective is justified. However, 
there may be several concerns with the current 
policy balance:
 m A focus of short-term (2020) deployment 
without complementary R&D policies and 
longer-term carbon scarcity signals may lead 
to suboptimal investment in currently mature 
technologies. This may be detrimental to the 
dynamic efficiency of the EU’s decarbonization 
12.  A situation similar to that in Australia, where the 
government is intending to negotiate the premature 
closure of the dirtiest coal-fired plant is not inconceivable. 
13.  Excluding nuclear. 
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path in the electricity sector, which will depend 
on the development and roll-out of technolo-
gies across the whole learning curve. The im-
perative of a decarbonization strategy robust 
against future uncertainty implies the imple-
mentation of long-term carbon scarcity sig-
nals in order to leverage technological inno-
vation across supply options and throughout 
the innovation curve.  
 m There is a risk that current subsidy schemes 
will not be socially sustainable. Already several 
countries have wound back support schemes 
(Czech Republic, Spain). In addition, the reli-
ance on support schemes for low-carbon gen-
eration shifts the economic burden to ratepay-
ers, while reducing the carbon price signal for 
other economic actors. This leads to economic 
distortions and potential inequities. There is the 
risk that such distortions could reduce the price 
incentives to invest in other lower carbon tech-
nologies.  This is not to say that a mix of in-
struments is unnecessary, but rather that the 
balance between instruments should be as 
finely tuned as possible given the objectives 
and market failures they are designed to ad-
dress. Clearly, mature RES technologies such 
as onshore wind and some biomass should 
enter the portfolio of investment on an eco-
nomic basis (driven by the carbon price, not 
support schemes) by the end of the decade. 
4.2.3. Summary 
This section has surveyed the characteristics of 
low-carbon technology options in the electricity 
sector. It has noted the very high inertias in the 
sector, due to the lead in times for large capital 
investments and long lifetimes of assets once 
built. This implies the need to immediately set 
a long-term regulatory framework to shape 
investment decisions for the next generation 
of plant (post 2020). It further argued that the 
risks attendant on each technology option should 
not be obfuscated. In this uncertain context, the 
overall decarbonization strategy should be robust 
against the widest possible range of eventualities 
with regard to future technology deployment and 
carbon/fuel price evolutions. Therefore a longer-
term policy framework would be desirable so 
that investments can take place in the presence 
of the fullest possible information regarding 
the longer-term evolution of the sector. This 
would allow companies to better manage tech-
nology risks, and potentially reduce those risks 
by stimulating private investment in R&D. The 
following section assess the impact of second-best 
policy effects (such as short-termism) on private 
actors’ investment decisions. 
5. ThE POLiCy COnTEXT
Having begun with the concrete issues of demand 
and supply trends and scenarios, this section now 
turns to the policy context and its coherence with 
the climate objectives of the EU. It surveys first the 
investment needs for the transition and the invest-
ment impacts of second-best regulation, in order 
to underscore the imperative for a robust policy 
framework to attract and direct investment. Then 
it briefly discusses the role of the ETS within a 
balanced policy mix. Finally, it assesses the trans-
formational signal sent by the ETS and the current 
balance of policy instruments.    
5.1. Investment needs and 
implications for policy
A very significant ramp-up of investment rates 
is necessary for the EU to meet its decarboniza-
tion objectives in the power sector.  Table 2 above 
displays estimated investment costs of the low-
carbon transition in the EU power sector relative 
to baseline scenarios. These indicate that, firstly, 
roughly a doubling of investment intensity is 
Table 2. Investment costs in the power sector 
study Power sector emissions objective by 2050 investment costs
EC, 2011 93-99% below 1990 levels Cumulatively € 2.2 – 2.6 trillion for generation plant, compared to 1.7 trillion 
in the reference scenario 
Cumulatively € 1.6 – 2 trillion for grid investment, compared to 1.3 trillion in 
the reference scenario 
ECF, 2010 At least 95% below 1990 levels €55-70 billion per year between 2020 and 2035 for generation, compared to 
€25-30 billion per year over the last decade. Cumulatively, 1.3 trillion over the 
next 15 years. 
Eurelectric, 2011 Economy-wide at least 75% below 1990 
levels, emissions from the power sector of ca. 
25 kg/MWh 
Cumulatively €’05 1.75 trillion by 2050 for generation plant, 12% higher than 
the baseline
Cumulatively €’05 1.5 trillion in for grid investment, 35% higher than the 
baseline.  
Source: as indicated in text. 
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required relative to recent historical investment 
rates (cf. Eurelectric, 2011, pp. 72; ECF, 2010, pp. 
70).14 Secondly, incremental investments in the 
order of 12-30% for power generation, and 35-40% 
for grids, are required, relative to baseline levels 
(EC, 2011; Eurelectric, 2011). Thirdly, across the 
scenarios, average levelized costs of electricity 
may emerge roughly equal across the decarboniza-
tion and baseline scenarios in the period to 2050, 
although this depends heavily on the modeled 
fossil fuel prices and learning rates of low-carbon 
technologies.   
Generally speaking, low-carbon investments in 
the power sector are characterized by high capi-
tal intensity, and high dependence on the policy 
framework to ensure competitiveness relative to 
conventional technologies. These investments 
will need to be made in an environment in which, 
currently:
 m government commitment to policy objectives 
and instruments remains ambiguous; 
 m costs of debt are high due to general liquidity 
constraints in the financial sector, and techno-
logical uncertainties and novel business models 
for most low-carbon generation technologies; 
 m as a result of financial crisis, utilities have scaled 
back capital expenditure programs and under-
taken balance sheet consolidation  (see Eurelec-
tric, 2010b on the impact of the financial crisis 
on utilities);
In addition, it is clear that, given the scale of the 
investment challenge, traditional modes of financ-
ing in the electricity sector, i.e. balance sheet bor-
rowing and project finance, will not suffice (ECF, 
2011; Accenture and Barclays, 2011). There is the 
need to attract new institutional investors to the 
low-carbon energy sector, in order to broaden 
the pool of available capital and accelerate capi-
tal recycling in the sector. These considerations 
underscore the imperative of a robust policy 
framework to attract and direct scaled up capi-
tal from new sources to the sector. 
5.2. Investment under 
uncertainty in the 
electricity sector
A large literature exists concerning the impact 
of climate policy uncertainty on the timing and 
content of investment decisions in the power 
sector. Different methods of assessment of invest-
ment under uncertainty are applied, including real 
options theory, scenario analysis, and the capital 
14. Relative to historical rates, a significant increase in 
investment intensity is also necessary in the baseline 
scenarios. 
asset pricing model (for a summary of analytical 
methods, see e.g. Neuhoff, 2007). This is not the 
place for an exhaustive review of this literature, 
but several common conclusions from the litera-
ture on investment under uncertainty can be 
highlighted: 
 m Policy uncertainty can create incentives to de-
lay investment decisions, in order to profit from 
learning-by-waiting. The incentive to delay is 
in inverse proportion to the expected timing of 
resolution of the policy uncertainty. In other 
words, the closer the expected resolution of 
uncertainty, the greater the incentive to delay 
investment (Yang et al, 2008). Given that any 
decision to revise the Phase III cap would need 
to be taken by the end of 2012, and that the 
post-2020 cap would have to be fixed by 2015-
2016 at the latest, there is likely to be a strong 
incentive to delay investment to learn of future 
policy commitments. This may present en-
ergy security concerns for countries facing 
large investment needs (e.g. UK, Poland or 
Germany).  
 m Policy uncertainty can result in higher costs 
of capital and distorted investment decisions, 
increasing the costs of implementing climate 
policy (IEA, 2007). In particular, removing the 
(heroic) assumption of perfect policy foresight 
among economic actors, macro-economic costs 
of policy increase exponentially and inversely 
to the length of the credible policy commitment 
(cf. Bosetti and Victor, 2011). This is explained 
by suboptimal capital investments (lock-in) and 
also lower investment in low-carbon R&D (de-
layed innovation).  
 m Policy uncertainty can distort the content of 
capital investment decisions. In particular, pol-
icy related uncertainty could disadvantage high 
capex, low-carbon investments, as these i) suf-
fer especially from higher risk-adjusted capital 
costs; ii) rely on the policy-framework to de-
liver profitability, i.e. the internalization of the 
economic externality of GHG emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion and the resulting long-
term change in relative prices between energy 
technologies. 
 m Policy initiatives to reduce the long-term vola-
tility of carbon prices through longer-term, 
credible commitments and potentially comple-
mentary policies, such as price caps/floors, can 
increase the propensity to invest in low carbon 
generation assets, and improve the environment 
for new entrants into the electricity sector (cf. 
Kettunen et al, 2011). As noted above in section 
6.3 above, the scale of the investment chal-
lenge necessitates the inclusion of new, and 
therefore likely risk-averse, investors.  
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5.3. What role for the 
ETS in a policy mix? 
The coexistence of multiple market failures and 
multiple policy objectives implies the need for a 
mix of policy instruments. However, care must be 
taken to ensure that this mix is optimally balanced 
against its short and long-term objectives. The ETS 
currently forms, ostensibly at least, the center-
piece of the EU’s decarbonization policy. In theory, 
an ETS can achieve efficient reductions of GHGs 
by changing the relative prices of high and low-
carbon generation options, and between energy 
savings and energy consumption. It was noted 
in the introduction, however, that the EU’s (and 
arguably, the world’s) agenda is moving slowly 
away from a paradigm of tinkering at the margin 
towards long-term low-carbon development. In 
this context, the transformational aspects of the 
ETS as current designed need to be considered. 
In economic theory, multiple policy instruments 
are justified by multiple market failures. Broadly 
speaking, alongside the externality of GHGs, three 
further market failures justify interventions: 
 m Coordination externalities: the private benefit of 
expanding a network is exceeded by the public 
benefit. As Bowen et al note, in such situations, 
“… [w]ithout public intervention, the market 
response is an underinvestment in expanding 
the network, as coordination between users 
and suppliers of the infrastructure can be hard 
to achieve” (2009, pp. 4). Such network effects 
can play a very significant role in retarding the 
transition to a low-carbon energy supply, e.g. in 
the case of smart grids or grid interconnectors. 
 m Information barriers and access to capital: con-
sumers lack information and capital to make ra-
tional decisions. This applies particularly where 
consumers are disorganized (i.e. private individ-
uals compared to firms) and decisions involve 
novel technologies. Policies to give consumers 
easier access to adequate technology and capital 
can be crucial to implement e.g. energy savings. 
 m Innovation spillovers: knowledge can be de-
scribed as a public good, in so far as it can be 
difficult to exclude others from using it, the pat-
ent regime notwithstanding. As they are unable 
to appropriate the full benefits of innovation, 
private actors will under invest in R&D. 
Alongside these economic considerations, some 
political economy factors need to be taken into ac-
count. The difficulty for new technologies to enter 
the electricity and energy sector more broadly has 
been well analyzed by Unruh (2002). Incumbent 
technologies operate within an existing techno-
institutional framework, which can pose signifi-
cant political economy and systemic barriers to 
the penetration of new technologies. In addition, 
where very high carbon prices are required to 
change the relative prices of high and low-carbon 
technologies, the political feasibility of imposing 
such prices may be low, particularly in the absence 
of a robust international agreement and the pres-
ence of powerful, organized stakeholders covered 
by an ETS  (see e.g. Victor, 2011). In such instances, 
targeted push and pull instruments may be desir-
able to facilitate the commercialization of new 
technologies beyond the effect of a second-best 
ETS, an example being feed in tariffs or premiums 
for low-carbon generation. 
These considerations notwithstanding, the ETS 
still has a vital role to play. Carbon pricing is the 
only instrument that can efficiently coordinate 
economic decisions across the millions of consum-
ers and producers who must ultimately change 
their economic behavior. In this regard, carbon 
pricing provides the broadest and most credible 
signal to economic actors on the development of 
markets, including those not covered by the ETS. 
Robust carbon pricing is necessary, but not suffi-
cient. Indeed, in directing private investment and 
providing public revenues, there is a clear comple-
mentarity between carbon pricing and supplemen-
tary public policies for innovation and efficiency 
(see e.g. Alfsen et al, 2010). 
A more robust, longer-term carbon price could 
expedite the transition to a more efficient and har-
monized system of support for decarbonization. 
Indeed it is the absence of this - due to government 
hesitation and slow progress internationally – that 
is leading to the multiplication and fragmentation 
of support schemes in the EU (the UK Electricity 
Market Reform is a case in point). Such fragmen-
tation risks distortions and inefficiencies at the EU 
level, and potentially threatens the long-term in-
compatibility between EU regulatory regimes and 
energy systems. The ETS therefore also plays a 
crucial role in coordinating the action of EU 
Member States. In light of this introduction, the 
following section assesses the achievements and 
deficiencies of the ETS as currently designed, with 
particular focus on its transformational aspects.
5.4. The signal sent by the EU ETS
The EU ETS is the central instrument for achieving 
“reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost 
effective and economically efficient manner… so 
as to contribute to the levels of reductions that 
are considered scientifically necessary to avoid 
dangerous climate change” (Directive, 2009/29/
EC, §1). Its implementation represents a significant 
policy success for the EU. It has delivered a price 
on carbon emissions, and ensures the achievement 
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of quantity targets in the covered sectors. Research 
suggests that the EU ETS has brought the issue of 
carbon management into company boardrooms, 
and has influenced company RD&D strategies 
(Rogge et al, 2011). Although there are methodo-
logical difficulties with measuring policy-induced 
reductions against a counterfactual, it seems that 
the ETS has also induced emissions abatement in 
Phase I (Ellerman et al, 2010), and also in the start 
of Phase II, even when accounting for the impact 
of the recession (Egenhofer et al, 2010; Abrell et 
al, 2011). The revisions to the ETS brought about 
in the 2008 climate and energy package will likely 
improve its efficacy, particularly the shift to full 
auctioning15 and the extension of the cap to 2020. 
However, it can be questioned to what extent, in 
its current form, the ETS actually creates an invest-
ment framework consistent with the long-term 
decarbonization of the power sector. Empirical re-
search by Rogge et al (2011b) finds that utilities’ 
longer-term expectations regarding the future car-
bon price are a key factor determining the invest-
ment relevance of the ETS. In the current context, 
they find that the ETS currently plays a small role 
in shaping power sector investment decisions, rel-
ative to other factors such as fuel and electricity 
prices and technology specific measures such as 
feed-in tariffs (see below). However, power utili-
ties are currently highly uncertain of the level of 
future carbon prices, i.e. in 2020 and beyond (Rog-
ge et al, 2011b). Criticisms of the transformational 
aspects of the ETS can take four forms. 
5.4.1. The absence of a consistent long-term 
signal 
The revised ETS directive establishes an automatic 
annual cap reduction by 1.74% in the average 
total quantity of allowances issued by Member 
15. With a transitional derogation for highly coal dependent, 
poorer Member States. 
States during Phase II. The linear reduction factor 
continues after 2020, but should be reviewed by 
2025 at the latest (Directive, 2009/29/EC, §9). 
Thus, ostensibly the ETS sends a long-term scarcity 
signal to economic actors in the covered sectors. 
However, it is clear that, firstly, this reduction rate 
is not consistent with the long-term decarboniza-
tion of the electricity sector. Under the current rate 
of cap decline, it is estimated that the ETS sector 
would reduce emissions by ~50% by 2050, rela-
tive to 2005 levels; this compares with a reduction 
of 88-92% by covered sectors under an economy 
wide reduction of 77-81% by 2050 (EC, 2011, p. 54). 
Given the mandatory review by 2025 and the 
acknowledged inconsistency between the current 
ETS trajectory and the EU’s long-term objective, 
it appears that stakeholders discount post-2020 
carbon scarcity. For example, a Norton-Rose sur-
vey of investors finds that less than 10% consider 
that the EU ETS has provided a strong enough 
price incentive to switch from high to low-carbon 
investments; not a single respondent considered 
that the EU had provided long-term price certain-
ty to incentivize low-carbon investment (IIGCC, 
2011). For power generators, this is confirmed by 
a survey conducted by Rogge et al (2011b), which 
finds that some 38.7% of survey participants con-
sidered themselves “very unsure” of 2020 carbon 
prices; 30.6% considered themselves “unsure”; 
and just 6.5% and 1.6% described themselves as 
“confident” or “very confident”. Clearly, the diffi-
cult macro-economic condition plays a role in this 
uncertainty; however, policy uncertainty is also a 
significant contributing factor, as the two follow-
ing sections below discuss.
5.4.2. The long-term uncertainty of the 
carbon price signal 
Despite the longer-term annual cap reduction 
inscribed in the directive, economic actors appear 
to discount post-2020 carbon scarcity in setting the 
Source: futures prices from EEX data; projections from Reuters survey, August 2011.
figure 4. EUA futures prices 2011-2015, left panel; financial intermediaries’ projections for EUA prices Phase III, right panel
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current market price. Currently traded EUA futures 
prices reach around 15 Euro by 2015, while Phase 
III projections from the major financial intermedi-
aries average around 24 Euro (Figure 5 above). It 
can be questioned whether such levels incorporate 
scarcity in future periods, given that, in theory at 
least, the cap should decline indefinitely by 1.74%. 
Power sector investors are motivated by existing 
legislated policies and futures prices; less legally 
precise policies, such as the commitment to post-
2020 scarcity in the ETS, seem to be discounted 
from pricing decisions.
This point can be underscored by an analysis of 
future carbon price uncertainties. In general, price 
fluctuations based on changes in fundamentals, 
e.g. fuel prices, should not necessarily be the con-
cern of policy-makers (cf. Fuss et al, 2008). These 
are investment risks that the private sector should 
reasonably adopt. Of more concern, however, is 
the case where policy-driven risks contribute sig-
nificantly to carbon price uncertainty. Policy driv-
en uncertainty in the ETS derives from a number 
of factors, including i) the level of the 2020 cap 
given the ongoing debate about the move to 30% 
emissions reductions; ii) the delivery of comple-
mentary policies, such as energy efficiency and 
renewables objectives to 2020; iii) the uncertain 
trajectory of the post-2020 cap.  
Blyth and Bunn (2011) construct a model com-
bining stochastic market-based and policy-related 
uncertainties to build a picture of the marginal 
price uncertainty in the ETS to 2020 and 2030. 
The paper finds that policy related risks, in par-
ticular the uncertain cap trajectory, are very sig-
nificant on the 2020 timeframe, and dominate 
on the 2030 timeframe. The central results of the 
paper are shown in figure 6 below. In addition, in 
lower policy commitment scenarios, ETS prices 
are significantly driven by policy-related uncer-
tainties such as the delivery of complementary 
policies in energy efficiency or RES (see also be-
low). By contrast, in scenarios with tighter caps, 
ETS price fluctuations are largely driven by mar-
ket fundamentals. The absence of a more strin-
gent and long-term price signal under the ETS, 
coupled with significant public (fiscal) commit-
ment to complementary policies, may suggest an 
imbalance of policy instruments and a suboptimal 
allocation of risk between the public and private 
sectors. 
5.4.3. Consistency of policy instruments
ETS and Energy Efficiency
The analysis cited above underscores the impor-
tance of carefully balancing instruments within the 
policy mix. These instruments interact in highly 
complex ways. Broadly speaking, the overlap of 
RES and energy efficiency instruments with an 
ETS will impact the scarcity and price within the 
ETS, as some of the abatement demand will be 
delivered outside of the carbon price. It should 
be stressed again that this does not mean that 
an instrument mix is unjustified, but rather that 
instruments should be balanced as far as possible 
given their objectives. 
It is debatable whether the EU’s 20/20/20 by 
2020 objectives were internally coherent, even be-
fore the economic crisis. Pre-crisis modeling by the 
Commission for the impact assessment of the 2008 
climate and energy package indicates a reduction 
in primary energy consumption of just 6.2% in the 
Climate and Energy package scenario with CDM 
and JI trading verses the baseline scenario (Cap-
ros et al, 2008). This compares with the agreed 
objective of a 20% primary energy saving against 
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figure 5. Sources of marginal cost uncertainty in the ETS, 2020 and 2030
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the pre-crisis baseline projection of the Commis-
sion by 2020. Thus already before the crisis, the 
EU’s policy instruments were not calibrated in a 
manner consistent with the 20% energy savings 
objective.
The economic crisis has led to a dramatic reduc-
tion in energy demand, with consequent impacts 
on the ETS price. In addition, the EU is preparing 
further energy efficiency measures, necessary to 
meet the energy savings objective (EC, 2011c).16 
The Commission’s impact assessment estimates 
that the proposed energy efficiency directive 
would reduce primary energy consumption in 
the EU by 19.7 to 20.1% by 2020, relative to the 
PRIMES 2007 Baseline scenario (EC, 2011c). This 
would bring the EU in line with its 20% energy 
savings target. Furthermore, the impact assess-
ment projects significant reductions in electricity 
demand relative to the PRIMES 2009 Baseline. 
Under the Baseline scenario, gross annual elec-
tricity generation is projected to be 3795.4 TWh 
in 2020, while in 2030 it reaches 4191.9 TWh (EU, 
2010, pp. 67). By contrast, in the PRIMES 20% en-
ergy savings scenario of the Commission’s impact 
assessment, gross annual electricity generation 
reaches 3234.695 TWh in 2020 and 3400.449 TWh 
in 2030. 
Figure 7 shows the progression in electricity de-
mand projections from the pre-crisis BAU scenar-
io (Capros et al, 2008), to the climate and energy 
package (Capros et al, 2008), and the post-crisis 
impact assessment of the 2011 energy efficiency 
directive (EC, 2011c). This underscores again 
16. The proposed package of measures includes: an EU-wide 
energy savings obligation on utilities; refurbishment 
obligations for public buildings; improved information 
in consumer energy bills; mandatory energy audits, and 
requirements to equip new generation capacity and high-
heat-demand industry installations with heat recovery
that the ETS was not configured ex ante in a 
manner consistent with the 20% energy sav-
ings target.
In this regard, two points should be considered. 
 m The overlap of instruments leads to signifi-
cant price risks in the ETS, as it is by no means 
assured that energy efficiency objectives will 
actually be delivered (Blyth and Bunn, 2011). 
On the flip side, the presence of complementary 
efficiency policies reduces upside risks of so-
cially unacceptably high carbon prices to deliver 
quantity targets. Optimal policy entails a bal-
ancing act of short-term static efficiency taking 
into account market failures across the abate-
ment curve, and long-term dynamic efficiency 
(see below).    
 m In its impact assessment for the proposed en-
ergy efficiency directive, the PRIMES modeling 
assumed perfect foresight among market actors 
and optimal banking until  (EC, 2011c, pp. 
75) – even in this case, the ETS price is reduced 
to 14.2 Euro/ton in 2020. However, these con-
ditions clearly do not hold currently – market 
actors have neither perfect foresight nor even a 
credible regulatory commitment post-2020, let 
alone to 2050. Therefore, the actual delivery 
of RES and efficiency objectives would likely 
significantly reduce the carbon price in the 
ETS, weakening its dynamic efficiency. 
It should be stressed: it is not an either/or ques-
tion with regard to the ETS and energy efficiency. 
Both are necessary parts of the EU decarboniza-
tion policy mix, as was argued regarding energy 
savings in section 4 above. However, in designing 
overlapping instruments it is necessary ex ante 
to calibrate the ETS to generate carbon scarcity 
after energy efficiency policies have been fac-
tored in. 
ETS and RES policies 
The ETS and RES policies interact in so far as RES 
policies deliver abatement outside of the ETS 
and hence reduce the carbon scarcity within the 
system. The overlap of instruments may be justi-
fied from the perspective of multiple goals, such 
as industrial policy or energy security. In addition, 
given long lead times in physical systems and the 
need for rapid innovation in low-carbon technolo-
gies, “starting early” with high cost abatement 
options can indeed be justified from the perspec-
tive of dynamic efficiency (Vogt-Schilb and Halle-
gatte, 2011).
There is evidence that RES policies are currently 
the dominant driver of decarbonization in Europe-
an electricity systems. For example, the Australian 
Productivity Commission calculated total implicit 
abatement subsidies in the electricity systems of 
figure 6. Projections of gross electricity generation, 2010-2030
Source: Capros et al, 2008; EC, 2011c.
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the UK and Germany of 52.5-138.6 Euro/ton and 
95.9 – 122.5 Euro/ton respectively, compared to a 
carbon price of 14 Euro/ton in the study year (APC, 
2011, pp. xxvii). According to the same study, non-
ETS policies delivered up to 98% (!) of power 
sector abatement in the study year. Calculating 
“effective” carbon prices and abatement from 
non-carbon pricing policies is fraught with meth-
odological difficulties. However, this does provide 
some analytical support for Rogge et al’s (2011, 
2011b) and the IIGCC (2011) interviews with power 
and financial sector actors, which concluded that 
the ETS played a relatively insignificant role in 
driving abatement and investment currently. 
Careful conclusions 
Policy-makers are faced with a conflict of interest 
between static and dynamic efficiency in carbon 
pricing instruments (cf. del Río González, 2008). 
In the short-term, the objective of static efficiency17 
implies seeking the lowest carbon price to reach a 
given objective. In the longer-term perspective, 
dynamic efficiency implies maintaining (the cred-
ible expectation of) a sufficiently high carbon price 
to create incentives for innovation and deploy-
ment of low-carbon technologies, in order to reach 
longer-term objectives at lowest cost. However, 
in the context of second-best political economy 
considerations it may be difficult to implement 
sufficiently high carbon prices across organized, 
powerful constituencies (such as industry), and 
more targeted pull instruments may provide a 
solution. In addition, dynamic efficiency consid-
erations can justify “starting early” on high cost 
abatement options.     
However, two consideration need to be made: 
 m It was emphasized in section 5.2.1 that decar-
bonization policies need to be robust against 
multiple future scenarios. This implies pursu-
ing all abatement options in the short and long-
term. Technology neutral instruments, such 
as the ETS, have the advantage of providing 
efficient economic signals across the suite 
of supply-side technologies and demand-
side abatement options. In addition, the ETS 
plays a crucial role in coordinating Member 
State actions on abatement and ensuring a 
level playing field in the EU.  
 m The social cost of policies needs to be moni-
tored and controlled. If complementary poli-
cies distort price signals and partially shift the 
abatement burden to diffuse and politically dis-
organized constituencies (ratepayers), there is 
the risk that they may be neither equitable nor 
17. i.e. equal marginal abatement costs across economic 
actors and sectors. 
sustainable in the long run. Given the scale of 
investments required and the need (especial-
ly in the current climate) to sustain public 
and political acceptance for climate policy, 
efficiency is at a premium. 
Once again it is not a question of either/or with 
regard to RES, energy efficiency and ETS policies. 
Rather, it is a question of the balance of short and 
long-term signals within and between abatement 
options. It can be questioned whether the current 
balance is optimal.  
5.4.4. Potential over-allocation of the ETS as 
a result of the crisis
The economic crisis led to a decline in economic 
activity of the covered sectors. As a result, emis-
sions have also fallen, by some 11.3% between 
2008 and 2009 (EC, 2011b). According to the 
post-crisis PRIMES 2009 Baseline and Reference 
scenarios, between 2008 and 2012 a buffer of ~2.3 
Gt will accrue due to emissions being lower than 
the cap. In the Baseline scenario, which assumes 
weaker implementation of the non-ETS and RES 
objectives, 1.6 Gt of unused permits remain in 
2020. In the Reference scenario, which assumes 
full implementation of the non-ETS and RES 
targets, unused credits in 2020 are higher, at 2.4 
Gt in 2020 (figures from EC, 2010b, pp. 30-34). In 
other words, the 2020 ETS cap may not send suffi-
ciently strong transformational signals during and 
beyond the current period due to the build-up of a 
significant buffer of allowances (cf. also Galharret 
and Guérin, 2011).  
If the ETS sent scarcity signals via a longer-term 
cap consistent with long-term objectives, com-
bined with certainty regarding the banking of al-
lowances, this apparent oversupply would be of 
lesser concern. In theory, firms would arbitrage 
between periods, bringing forward some reduc-
tions on the prospects of higher carbon prices in 
future periods. In addition, longer cap horizons 
coupled with banking would reduce current price 
volatility, as price formation would take into ac-
count price factors averaged out over longer time 
periods (Fankhauser and Hepburn, 2010). How-
ever, it was noted above that the level of the post 
2020 caps is currently unclear to market partici-
pants. Moreover, if policy is incredible or if im-
perfect foresight among market participants is 
considered, over-allocation could have significant 
implications on banking behavior and hence per-
mit price formation (Paltsev, 2009). For example, 
70Watt estimates that permit prices could drop 
significantly in the ETS if industrial actors cashed 
their surpluses due to preferences for cash rather 
than permits, or un-credible policy after 2020 
(70Watt, 2011).
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5.4.5. Summary
With regard to the impact of climate policy, utility 
investment decisions are largely driven by the 
existing policy framework, and in particular, expec-
tations regarding future carbon prices. While the 
ETS has provided a post-2020 scarcity signal, this 
is i) not consistent with the EU’s long-term objec-
tives and is subject to possible revision by 2025 at 
the latest; ii) is highly uncertain due to outstanding 
decisions in the current policy framework; iii) 
potentially weakened by the suboptimal interaction 
of climate policy instruments, and by the accrual of 
a significant surplus of allowances and the absence 
of a long-term framework with banking. This risks 
delaying or distorting investments to the determent 
of the efficiency and potential feasibility of the EU’s 
decarbonization pathway.   
6. COnCLusiOns: POLiCy 
RECOMMEndATiOns
The focus of the EU’s climate policy is increasingly 
shifting from short-term emissions reductions at 
the margin to long-term, low-carbon development. 
This places the EU’s 2020 objectives in a new light: 
it is no longer sufficient that they are achieved, 
rather they must be designed to place the EU on 
a feasible trajectory to large-scale decarbonization 
by 2050. This paper has examined the role of the 
electricity sector in the transition. Its focus has 
been placed on the status quo, i.e. an examination 
of current investment and demand trends as they 
are shaped, among other factors, by the existing 
policy mix. In this manner, it aimed to highlight 
potential inconsistencies with current trends and 
policies and the trajectories implied by the 2050 
decarbonization of the sector. 
Ambitious gains in energy efficiency were high-
lighted as a key condition for the decarbonization 
of the sector, and to facilitate its contribution to the 
decarbonization of final consumption sectors. Ac-
cording to modeling released by the Commission, 
the proposed energy efficiency directive would 
have significant impacts on electricity demand to 
2020 and 2030. This would be positive in terms of 
preparing the sector for the longer-term electrifi-
cation of final demand. However, the analysis in 
this paper highlighted serious concerns with the 
impacts of the measures on the dynamic efficiency 
of the ETS. This does not mean that they should 
not be undertaken. Rather demand side policies 
should be the point of departure for supply side 
interventions: ETS caps should be set so as to 
achieve carbon scarcity after energy efficiency 
and RES objectives have been taken into ac-
count. Ideally, such caps would be long-term, i.e. 
beyond 2020, to reduce the volatility of prices by 
averaging out fluctuations in price factors (elec-
tricity demand, fuel prices, progress with imple-
menting complementary polices etc) over longer 
periods. 
Turning to the demand side, the study high-
lighted the high uncertainties and inertias in the 
electricity sector. These should not be obfuscated. 
Rather, they imply the need to immediately set 
a long-term regulatory framework to shape 
investment decisions for the next generation 
of plant (post 2020). In the context of uncertain 
technology developments, the overall decarbon-
ization strategy should be robust against the wid-
est possible range of eventualities. This implies 
that a longer-term policy framework would be 
desirable so that investments can take place in 
the presence of the fullest possible information 
regarding the longer-term evolution of the sec-
tor. The absence of this risks distortions in capital 
allocations, which could jeopardize the cost-effec-
tive achievement of the EU’s long-term objectives. 
With regard to the policy framework, the study 
emphasized the need for a balanced mix of policy 
instruments. Within this, however, the ETS is cru-
cial, as it can efficiently guide the economic deci-
sions of numerous economic actors across the val-
ue chain, and actions across Member States. The 
ETS, as currently designed, faces two major flaws: 
firstly, it does not send a credible longer-term 
signal to shape post 2020 investments. Given 
the sectoral inertias identified, it is vital that this 
is put in place as soon as possible. Secondly, the 
transformational signal of the ETS is weakened by 
the imbalanced of policy instruments, i.e. RES 
and energy efficiency, exacerbated by the crisis. 
In the light of this policy analysis, several recom-
mendations can be drawn. Firstly, the EU should 
begin the – likely drawn out – policy process of 
establishing post 2020 emissions caps. Second-
ly, a short-term adjustment of scarcity in the ETS 
may create some incentives for low-carbon invest-
ment (see e.g. Kettunen et al, 2011, for analysis on 
the timing of policy shocks to stimulate low-carbon 
investment). However, it would not address the 
fundamental concern, namely the lack of policy in-
formation regarding the post 2020 environment in 
which these investments will amortize. A discrete 
policy intervention to balance supply in the ETS 
is clearly second-best from this perspective, 
and if mismanaged could deter rather than pro-
mote investment. Thirdly, it is necessary for the 
EU to continually monitor the balance of policy in-
struments, and to coordinate future interventions 
across the instruments in order to avoid repeating 
the mistakes of the 2008 climate and energy pack-
age. Fourthly, the EU’s technology support policy 
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can be improved. Alongside market pull interven-
tions, basic R&D and a stronger carbon price also 
have a clear role to play in the delivery of RES and 
efficiency objectives. The absence thereof could 
shift delivery risks to the public sector, and lead to 
economic distortions and inequities in the distri-
butions of burdens among economic actors. 
With the 2008 climate and energy package, 
the EU has taken significant steps towards a low-
carbon economy and electricity sector. However, 
conditions have significantly changed since the 
package’s adoptions, and internal inconsistencies 
and omissions in the package are becoming more 
evident. The analysis in this paper has highlight-
ed some of these. Interventions to lengthen and 
strengthen the carbon price signal and improve 
the balance of policy instruments can consolidate 
the steps the EU has already taken, avoiding po-
tentially greater costs and delivery risks from the 
current trajectory. ❚
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